We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and OWMMS fairness. We first highlight the fact that commonly-used algorithms that work well for the allocation of goods to asymmetric agents, and even for chores to symmetric agents do not provide good approximations for allocation of chores to asymmetric agents under WMMS. As a consequence, we present a novel polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm, via linear program, for OWMMS. For two special cases: the binary valuation case and the 2-agent case, we provide exact or better constant-approximation algorithms.
Introduction
We consider fair allocation of indivisible chores when agents have asymmetric shares. In contrast to the case of goods for which agents have positive value, chores are disliked by agents and they have negative values for them. The fairness concept we focus on is the maxmin share (MMS) fairness which was designed for allocation of indivisible items. MMS is based on the thought experiment that if the items are partitioned into bundles and an agent would always get the least preferred bundle of items, what is the best way she can partition the items. The value of such a bundle is the maxmin share of the agent. An allocation is deemed MMS fair if each agent gets her required share.
Maxmin share fairness was proposed by [Budish, 2011] as a fairness concept for allocation of indivisible items. It is a relaxation of proportionality fairness that requires each of the n agents should get a value that is at least 1/n of the total value she has for the set of all items. When items are divisible, maxmin share fairness coincides with proportionality. Maxmin share fairness is a weaker concept when items are indivisible. It was conjectured that a maxmin fair allocation always exists but [Procaccia and Wang, 2014 ] identified a counter-example. Since the work of [Procaccia and Wang, 2014] , there are several papers on algorithms that find an approximate MMS allocation [Amanatidis et al., 2015; Barman and Murthy, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2018; Aziz et al., 2017] . All these works make a typical assumption that agents are symmetric and should be treated in a similar manner.
[ Farhadi et al., 2017] were the first to consider MMS fairness for the case where indivisible goods are allocated and the agents are not symmetric because they may have different entitlement share of the goods. Ideally, an agent would expect to get a share of the total value that is proportional to her entitlement. However, when items are indivisible, MMS fairness needs to be suitably generalized to the cater for asymmetric entitlement shares. Farhadi et al. general- ized MMS fairness to that of the more general MMS concept as weighted MMS (WMMS) that caters for entitlements. They devised a simple ordinal (that only used the qualitative ranking information of items) algorithm that ensures an n-approximation guarantee for WMMS where each agent's allocation is at least 1/n of her value in a WMMS allocation. Beyond the results for goods [Farhadi et al., 2017; Farhadi et al., 2019] , not much is known about chore allocation when the agents are asymmetric despite the recent active research in fair allocation of goods and chores. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the results for goods from one setting could carry over the other [Aziz, 2016] .
In this paper, we focus on the fair allocation of chores rather than goods for asymmetric agents. In the case of chores, agents do not have entitlements but relative shares. If an agent has a higher share, she is expected to take a higher load of the chores. Treating agents asymmetrically may be a requirement for several reasons. For example, countries with a larger population and CO2 emission may be liable to undertake more responsibility to clean up the environment. In this paper, the central research question we examine is the following one. 
Contributions
We consider a model of allocation of chores in which agents have relative shares as compared to entitlements. Different to the case of symmetric agents, we first prove that even with only two agents, no algorithm can simultaneously guarantee each agent's value to be higher than her weighted maxmin share. Moreover, we show that many greedy algorithms widely used in the literature, including [Farhadi et al., 2017] and [Aziz et al., 2017] , may have arbitrarily bad performance.
Then we design a polynomial-time algorithm which provides a 4-approximation to the minimal relaxation of WMMS value (OWMMS) under which a WMMS allocation exists. To present this algorithm, we first study a special case when all agents have an identical valuation. The algorithm combines (1) the use of a greedy algorithm for the case of identical valuations and (2) linear programming and rounding techniques.
Finally, we study two restricted cases: a two-agent setting and a binary valuation setting. For the two-agent case, we present a variant of divide-and-choose protocol which ensures each agent's value is at least 3 2 of her weighted maxmin share; For binary valuations, we show that a WMMS allocation exists and can be efficiently computed. For asymmetric agents and indivisible items, this is the first algorithmic result for binary valuations.
Related Work
The fair allocation problem has been extensively studied in the cake cutting literature [Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Stromquist, 1980; Alon, 1987; Brams and Taylor, 1995; Brams and Taylor, 1996; Robertson and Webb, 1998; Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016] . In this line of work, researchers study how to fairly allocate a divisible item (e.g., cake) among a number of agents. Solution concepts such as envy-freeness and proportionality are prominent criteria for fairness. In the context of divisible goods, researchers have extended results for the case of equal entitlements to those of unequal entitlements (see e.g., [Cseh and Fleiner, 2018] ).
As for MMS fairness, it is already known that even for additive valuations, there exists an instance such that no allocation can simultaneously guarantee each agent receives at least her MMS [Kurokawa et al., 2018] . But approximate MMS can be efficiently computed; see [Barman and Murthy, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2018; Kurokawa et al., 2018] . Computing WMMS shares is an NP-hard problem for both goods and for chores even for the case of 2 agents and for equal shares. The statement can be derived via a reduction from the integer partition problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979] .
Most of the work on fair allocation of items is for the case of goods although recently, fair allocation of chores [Aziz et al., 2017] or combinations of goods and chores [Aziz et al., 2018] has received attention as well. It is shown by [Aziz et al., 2017] that MMS allocations for chores do not always exist but can be 2-approximated by a simple round-robin algorithm. [Aziz et al., 2017] also presented a PTAS for relaxation of MMS called optimal MMS. [Barman and Murthy, 2017] presented an improved approximation algorithm for MMS allocation of chores. Fair allocation of indivisible goods and asymmetric agents has also been studied [Farhadi et al., 2017; Farhadi et al., 2019] . We take a similar approach and study the chore allocation problem when the agents are not symmetric. [Babaioff et al., 2017] considered the allocation of indivisible goods where agents have different entitlements. One of the concepts that they propose is called ℓ-out-of-d MMS that can also apply to agents having ordinal preferences over bundles of chores. However, the paper focusses on results for goods.
Preliminaries
We begin by presenting our setting formally and discussing fairness concepts as well as some basic notations in the paper.
Setting
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a set of n agents, and M = {1, 2, · · · , m} be a set of m indivisible items. In this work, we always use i ∈ N and j ∈ M to indicate an agent and an item, separately. Each agent has a valuation func-
We assume that items are chores to every agent, i.e., V ij ≤ 0 for all j ∈ M and the valuations are additive, i.e., for any S ⊆ M , V i (S) = j∈S V ij . Without loss of generality and just for ease of presentation, throughout this paper except Section 6.2, it is assumed that all of the valuations are normalized, i.e. V i (∅) = 0 and V i (M ) = −1.
In this work, we consider the case when agents are asymmetric. Particularly, every agent has a share for the chores, namely s i ∈ (0, 1]. The shares add up to 1, i.e., i∈N s i = 1.
Letting
, we use I = (N, M, s, V ) to denote a chore allocation instance and I = (N, M, s, V ) when all agents have the identical valuation V . Note that when all agents have identical valuation V , V ({j}) is simplified as V j for any j ∈ M . Let Π(M ) be the set of all n-partitions of the items. A generic allocation will be denoted by X = X 1 , . . . , X n where X i is the bundle of agent i.
WMMS Fairness
Before presenting the WMMS fairness concept that takes into account the shares of the agents, we first present the standard MMS fairness concept that assumes the shares of the agents are equal. For symmetric agents, the classical maxmin share (MMS) of an agent i with valuation V i is defined as
Intuitively, when allocating items to n agents, each agent should get an allocation with a value that is 1/n of the total value they have for all the items. Since the items are not divisible, this proportionality requirement may be not achievable for the agents. In view of this, MMS i can be viewed as a relaxed lower bound on the value that agent i hopes for if she has the chance to partition the items into n bundles and every other agent adversarially chooses a bundle before i. Next, we generalize the classical MMS notion to the setting with asymmetric agents.
Definition 1 (Weighted MMS) Given any chore allocation instance I = (N, M, s, V ), for every agent i ∈ N , the weighted maxmin share (WMMS) value of i is defined as:
Any partition achieves WMMS i (I) is called a P-i partition.
When the instance I is clear from the context, we may use WMMS i for short. The definition above for WMMS fairness is exactly the same as that of WMMS as formalized by [Farhadi et al., 2017] for the case of goods except that the entitlement e i of an agent i is replaced by her share s i . As mentioned in the introduction, whereas a higher entitlement for goods is desirable for an agent, a higher share for chores is undesirable for the agent.
We call an allocation WMMS if the value of the allocation to each agent i is worth at least WMMS i to her. Similarly, an allocation is called α-WMMS, if the total value of items allocated to each agent i is at least αWMMS i for α ≥ 1.
Note that when all shares are equal, WMMS coincides with MMS fairness so it is a proper generalization of MMS. Secondly, we spell out an insight that also provides justification for the WMMS concept that was defined by [Farhadi et al., 2017] . We note that when the items are divisible, then WMMS i = s i V i (M ). Hence, for divisible chores, WMMS fairness also implies a natural generalization of proportionality that takes into account the shares of agents. We call the latter requirement as weighted proportionality.
In the following, we define some more notation that will be used in the paper. Given a chore allocation instance I = (N, M, s, V ), for any agent i and any partition X = X i i∈N , let
is the smallest degree of unfairness and WMMS i (I) = s i W i (I). Moreover, we have the following simple properties.
Lemma 1 Given any instance
Proof: Note that for any agent i and any allocation X i i∈N ,
, which is the weighted arithmetic mean of the terms
, with weights s k (whose sum is 1). As the mean equals −1, the smallest must be at most −1 and
Next we show a simple algorithm, Naive, which returns an n-WMMS allocation. Algorithm Naive produces an allocation that allocates all of the items to a single agent who has the highest share (ties are broken arbitrarily).
Lemma 2 Let I = (N, M, s, V ) be any chore allocation instance and X i i∈N be the output of Algorithm Naive. Then
Proof: Let i * be the agent who has the largest share, thus s i * ≥ 1 n . It is easy to see that for any agent i = i * , V i (X i ) = 0, which is trivially at least as large as nWMMS i (I). By Lemma 1,
We present the following example to provide additional intuition of WMMS and our notation. Example Let I = (N, M, s, V ) be a chore allocation instance, where N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the agents' shares and valuations are shown in Table 1 .
In this instance, for agent 1, allocating one of the four chores to herself and the remaining three chores to agent 2 is an exact weighted proportional allocation with respect to valuation V 1 . Then W 1 (I) = −1, F 1 (I) = 1 and WMMS 1 (I) = − 1 4 . Similarly, for agent 2, allocating chores {1, 2} to agent 2 and chores {3, 4} to agent 1 is an exact weighted proportional allocation with respect to valuation V 2 . Thus W 2 (I) = −1, F 2 (I) = 1 and WMMS 2 (I) = − 3 4 . Note that this allocation is bad for agent 1 since V 1 ({3, 4}) = − 1 2 < WMMS 1 (I). However, one of the weighted proportional allocations to agent 1, e.g., X 1 = {1} and X 2 = {2, 3, 4}, satisfies both of WMMS 1 (I) and WMMS 2 (I), since
Optimal WMMS Fairness
It is well known that for symmetric agents, no matter the items are goods or chores, an MMS allocation always exists for the 2-agent case. But for asymmetric agents, we note that an exact WMMS allocation may not exist even when there are only two agents. Indeed, by the following lemma, we see that the lower bound of the problem is at least 4 3 , which means that there is no allocation that can guarantee each agent's value to be greater than We first note that for agent 1, the unique P-1 partition is X = X 1 , X 2 with X 1 = {1} and X 2 = {2}, since 
, which is the largest among all possible allocations. Accordingly,
However, X is bad to agent 2, since V 2 (X 2 ) = − 1 2 < WMMS 2 (I) and X ′ is bad to agent 1, since V 1 (X ′ 1 ) = −1 < WMMS 1 (I). Therefore the best tradeoff to satisfy the two agents simultaneously would be allocation X ′ , since V 2 (X 2 ) = 3 2 WMMS 2 (I) and V 1 (X ′ 1 ) = 4 3 WMMS 1 (I). Indeed, we need to take all possible allocations into consideration, but it is easy to see that all other allocations can only be worse.
Thus, no algorithm could provide an allocation with each agent i's value being strictly larger than 4 3 WMMS i (I), which finishes the proof of Lemma 3. Accordingly, it is natural to consider a relaxed version of WMMS, optimal WMMS (OWMMS) fairness, which is similar to the one introduced in [Aziz et al., 2017] .
It is easy to see that WMMS i (I) ≥ OWMMS i (I) for any instance I and any agent i. For any partition
then X is called c-approximation to the OWMMS allocation.
Approximation Algorithms
For the case of goods allocation, the greedy round robin algorithm considered by [Farhadi et al., 2017] gives the best guarantee (of n-approximation for goods). Interestingly, the same algorithm was proved to provide a 2-approximation for MMS allocation of chores when agents are symmetric [Aziz et al., 2017] . However, when agents have different shares, such an algorithm can be arbitrarily poor. We provide a bad example in the appendix, where we also show that some natural attempts to 'fix' the bad performance of the greedy algorithm do not help.
In the following, we give our polynomial-time (4 + ǫ)-approximation algorithm. That is, for any ǫ > 0, it returns an allocation X i i∈N such that for any agent i, V i (X i ) ≥ (4 + ǫ)OWMMS i . In order to present the main algorithm, we first present a polynomial-time algorithm which guarantees each agent i's value to be at least 2WMMS i , when all of the agents have an identical valuation.
Identical Valuation
When all agents have an identical valuation, we show the algorithm, EgalGreedy defined in Algorithm 1, is a 2-approximation to an exact WMMS allocation.
The next lemma relies on a connection to the parallel processors scheduling problem. In this problem, there is a set of
ations
Require: Chore allocation instance (N, M, s, V ) Ensure: Allocation X = X1, . . . , Xn .
1: Initially, Xi = ∅ for all i ∈ N . 2: Order all chores from the lowest value to the highest value such that
5: Xi * = Xi * ∪ {j}. 6: return Allocation X.
jobs and a set of processors. Each job has to be processed exactly once on exactly one processor. Processors may have different speeds [Gonzalez et al., 1977; Friesen, 1987] . The problem specifies the time required to process a given job on a given machine. Typically, the goal of scheduling problems is to find an assignment of the jobs such that the longest finishing time (i.e., makespan) is minimized. A detailed survey of this line of work can be found in [Pinedo, 2016] . We prove the following Lemma 4 in the appendix.
Lemma 4 For any chore allocation instance
, where all agents have the identical valuation V , let X i i∈N be the allocation outputted by
One may suspect that a natural generalization of EgalGreedy to the case that agents have different valuations may work well. Unfortunately, in the appendix, we provide an example that such an algorithm cannot have any constant approximation ratio.
General Valuations
Now we are ready to study the general case when agents may have different valuations. For any chore allocation instance I = (N, M, s, V ), let variable α represent the WMMS ratio, and variable x ij ∈ {0, 1} represent whether agent i gets item j. Let x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈M . Then the problem of computing its OWMMS ratio and an OWMMS allocation can be formalized as the following integer program.
To solve IP, in what follows, we first prove a key technical lemma by using the rounding technique introduced by [Lenstra et al., 1990] , which gives us the tool to round a fractional assignment to an integer assignment.
Lemma 5 Let (N, M, s, V ) be any chore allocation instance, w = (w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w n ) ∈ (R − ) N , and
has a feasible solution, then any extreme pointx of this polytope (defining the solution space) can be rounded to a feasible solutionx of the integer program
Proof: Letx be an extreme point of the polytope defined by P. Thenx contains at most m + n nonzero variables due to the number of constraints in P. We construct a bipartite graph viax, G = (N, M, E), where N is the set of agents, M is the set of chores and E = {(i, j)|x ij > 0, i ∈ N, j ∈ M }. Using the same argument with the proof of Theorem 1 in [Lenstra et al., 1990] , we know that G is a pseudoforest, i.e., each connected component of G is a tree or a tree plus one additional edge. Next, we roundx tox. In any connected component C of G, whenever there is a chore j whose degree is 1, then it must be that for some i,x ij = 1. Then setx ij = 1 and delete this chore from C. Denote by C ′ the remained graph. Note that in C ′ , any remaining chore has a degree at least 2. Therefore C ′ must contain a matching which covers all chores, due to the fact that C ′ is a tree or a tree plus one additional edge. According to this matching, if (i, j) is matched, setx ij = 1; otherwise, setx ij to be 0.
Next, it suffices to verify thatx is a feasible solution of P ′ . For each chore j,x assigns it to exactly one agent. Thus, i∈Njx ij = 1 for any j ∈ M . For each agent i ∈ N , there is at most 1 chore j such thatx ij is increased to 1. Since
which completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Note that, solving the optimal α for integer program IP is equivalent to finding the minimum value of α such that IP has a feasible integer solution x. However, P is not the relaxation of IP since in P, there is not a variable x ij for which V ij < t i . Equivalently, we can add these variables to P and set them to zero. In the following, we discuss the relationship between the solutions of IP, P and P ′ . Recall that α * is the OWMMS ratio, which is also the optimal value of IP. Let c * = min{c ∈ R + 0 |P has a feasible solution with t i = w i = cWMMS i (I) for all i ∈ N }.
Note that c * always exists as c = n is always feasible by Algorithm Naive. Moreover, although P is not the relaxation of IP, c * is still a lower bound of α * .
Lemma 6 α * ≥ c * .
Lemma 6 shows that to approximate α * , it suffices to find a feasible solution of IP whose value is a good approximation to c * . Next, we show that a feasible solution of P ′ is naturally a feasible solution of IP.
Lemma 7 Let
Both Lemmas 6 and 7 are proved in the appendix. Before we show our main algorithm, let us discuss the following intuitive procedure. First, compute c * and its corresponding fractional allocationx. Then use Lemma 5 to roundx to an integer solutionx. By Lemma 7,x is also a feasible solution of IP. Let X = X i i∈N be the final allocation, where X i = {j ∈ M |x ij = 1} for every i ∈ N . Thus,
where the first inequality is by Lemma 5 and the second inequality is by Lemma 6. That is, X is a 2-approximation to the optimal WMMS allocation. However, there are two computational issues with respect to the procedure above: (1) (2), we use binary search to find a near optimal value of c * . Initially, we first use Algorithm Naive to get an upper bound n of α and 1 is a trivial lower bound. Let δ > 0 be the desired precision. Denote by u and l the current upper and lower bounds, respectively. Set c = u+l 2 and w i = t i = cWMMS ′ i , and check if P has a feasible solution. If P has a feasible solution, reset u to be u+l 2 ; Otherwise reset l = u+l 2 . Repeat this process until u − l ≤ δ.
We formally describe the algorithm described above as Algorithm 2, denoted by LinPro. 
where the first inequality is by Lemma 5, the second inequality is by Lemma 4, and the last inequality is by Lemma 6.
1 The computation of WMMSi is NP-hard, even when n = 2 and s1 = s2 = .
7:
Check if P has a feasible solution by setting wi = ti = cWMMS ′ i for all i ∈ N . 8:
if P has a feasible solution then 9:
Reset u = c. 10: else 11:
Reset l = c. 12: Set wi = ti = uWMMS ′ i for all i ∈ N and compute an extreme pointx of P. 13: Use Lemma 5 to roundx tox. 14: Set Xi = {j ∈ M |xij = 1} for all i ∈ N . 15: return Allocation X.
As LinPro requires us to run EgalGreedy and solve at most O(log( n ǫ )) numbers of (polynomial-sized) linear program, LinPro runs in polynomial time.
Note that the role of EgalGreedy in LinPro can be replaced by other (polynomial-time) approximation algorithms (such the PTAS in [Hochbaum and Shmoys, 1988] ) and the approximation ratio (Lemma 4) is improved accordingly.
Restricted Cases
In this section, we consider two important restricted cases: (1) two agents and (2) all agents have binary valuations (in which case agents have value 0 or -1 for each item).
WMMS for Two Agents
Given any instance I = (N, M, s, V ) with N = {1, 2}, we prove that it is always possible to guarantee each agent i's value to be at least ]. Divide-and-choose algorithms are widely studied in the literature, especially for the case of two agents. Roughly speaking, the algorithm starts by letting one of the agents divide the whole items (either goods or chores) into two bundles, and the other agent chooses one from the two bundles. Such an algorithm gives an exact MMS allocation for symmetric agents and a 2-WMMS allocation for asymmetric agents (the agent with smaller entitlement divides and the other agent chooses) when the items are goods. However, it is not hard to see that generic divide-and-choose algorithms could be arbitrarily bad when the items are chores.
In the following, we show that with some modification, a divide-and-choose style algorithm, DivCho (defined in Algorithm 3), works well and guarantees each agent i's value to be at least , set X1 = ∅ and X2 = M . Go to Step 5. 3: Let agent 2 partition M into A1 and A2 according to a P-2 partition with respect to WMMS2(I). 4: Let agent 1 select his favorite bundle from A1 and A2. Denote by X1 the one chosen by agent 1 and by X2 the one left for Agent 2. 5: X = X1, X2 . 6: return Allocation X. , Algorithm DivCho allocates all chores to agent 2. Thus V 1 (X 1 ) = 0 and V 2 (X 2 ) = −1, where agent 1 is trivially satisfied as
Then, for any agent
As we assume that s 2 ≥ s 1 , our last case is to consider
As a result, no matter which allocation agent 2 eventually receives after the divide-and-choose procedure, the value of the allocation will always be at least as much as WMMS 2 . For agent 1, since V (X 1 ) + V (X 2 ) = −1 by assumption and he selects his favorite allocation X 1 , V 1 (X 1 ) ≥ − 
Binary Valuations
In this section, we study the case with any number of agents, but every agent's valuation is binary: V ij ∈ {0, −1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M . Note that, throughout this section, we do not impose normalization for ease of exposition. As will be clear later, for this case, we show that it is always possible to guarantee each agent i's value to be at least WMMS i , i.e., the optimal WMMS ratio for binary valuation case is exactly 1.
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Proof: It suffices to show if V is uniform, Algorithm EgalGreedy returns an exact WMMS allocation. Suppose X = X i i∈N is the output of EgalGreedy with respect to
} be the set of indices where the minimum is obtained. In the following we show W = W (X). Note that S = ∅. If X is not an optimal partition, then there is a partition X * such that W (X * ) > W (X).
Thus, every k ∈ S, X k has to contain a smaller number of chores compared with X * k . Accordingly, for some t ∈ N \S, X t has to contain more chores than X * t , i.e.,
. But this is a contradiction with the fact that EgalGreedy always allocates greedily, (i.e., Step 4 of EgalGreedy), since the last chore cannot be allocated to X k for k ∈ S instead of X t . That is W = W(X).
Therefore,
≥ W(X) = W and V (X i ) ≥ s i W = WMMS i for any i ∈ N , which competes the proof.
Thus, by allocating all chores for which some agent has zero value to one such agent, we are left with only the chores for which all agents have value -1. As the modified instance if uniform, by Lemma 8, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For any binary valuation case, a WMMS allocation exists and can be found efficiently.
Conclusions
We initiated the study on chore allocation with asymmetric agents. We show that many widely studied greedy algorithms in the literature performs badly and even for the 2-agent case an exact WMMS allocation may not exist. We then presented a constant approximation polynomial time algorithm for OWMMS allocations, and several algorithmic results for the case of identical utilities, binary utilities, and for 2 agents. 
A Some Commonly Used Greedy Algorithms
In this section, we first show that the greedy round robin algorithm considered by [Farhadi et al., 2017] which gives the best guarantee (of n-approximation for goods) can be arbitrarily poor for the case of chores. This is surprising because the algorithm only uses ordinal preferences and higher entitlements and higher shares correlate with more items in the goods and chores setting respectively. We also show that natural attempts to 'fix' the bad performance of the greedy sequential algorithm does not help. Interestingly, the same round-robin greedy algorithm was proved to provide a 2-approximation for MMS allocation of chores when agents have the same shares [Aziz et al., 2017] .
A.1 Round Robin
We define the greedy algorithm Round-Robin as follows. The algorithm is oblivious to the shares of the agents. It is based on sequentially allocating items in a round robin manner. Each agent gets turns in a round robin manner to select one of her most preferred chores from all unselected chores.
Round-Robin: Specify an ordering of agents and let agents come in a round robin manner in the specified order and pick an item that is most preferred from the unallocated items. Stop when all the items have been allocated. Now we construct a bad instance. Let I = (N, M, s, V ) be a chore allocation instance with n agents and n 2 items, and
All agents have identical valuation V , defined as follows. Denote j ∈ M by j = kn + b, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ b < n−1, and
That is every agent has value − 1 (n + 1) n for any item in {1, · · · , n}; − 1 (n + 1) n−1 for any item in {n + 1, · · · , 2n};
. . .
Since i∈N s i → 1 and V (M ) = j∈M V j → 1 as n → ∞, the instance is well-defined. Note that it is easy to see the weighted proportional allocation with respect to V is to allocate all chores in {(i−1)n+1, · · · , in} to agent i ∈ N , where every agent's absolute value equals to her share, thus
However, following the Round-Robin protocol, the items selected by the agents is as follows: for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, during the kth round, each agent i will select one item from {(k − 1)n + 1, · · · , kn}. That is all items are 'uniformly' distributed among all agents such that each agent has value − 1 n for his own bundle. Let us consider agent 1 who has the smallest share with WMMS 1 (I) = − n (n+1) n . Since
the Round-Robin allocation to agent 1 is arbitrarily bad. Thus, Round-Robin does not have any bounded approximation guarantee for the optimal WMMS allocation.
A.2 Multiplicative-Greedy Algorithm
Next we consider the following greedy algorithm to modify the Round Robin algorithm. In contrast to Round-Robin, the picking order of the agents changes dynamically.
Multiplicative-Greedy: Let each agent's proportionality value be V i (M )s i , which is exactly s i if we normalize all valuations. Initialize allocation X i to be empty for each i ∈ N . Consider the agent i for whom V i (X i )/s i is the minimum. In case of ties, choose the agent with the largest s i . If there is still a tie, break tie lexicographically. Let the agent i select her most preferred untaken item. Repeat until all items are allocated.
Net we present a bad example to show that Multiplicative-Greedy cannot provide a good guarantee as well. We consider the following example shown in Table 3 . Thus agent 2 selects item 2 and then agent 1 selects item 1. This allocation is arbitrarily bad to agent 1 if 0 < ǫ < 1 is sufficiently small. On the other hand, if we modify Multiplicative-Greedy by using the smallest share to break ties, the algorithm performs poorly on following example in Table 4 . Multiplicative-Greedy will run as follows: Agent 1 selects item 2; Agent 2 selects item 1; Agent 3 selects item 3; At this time, , agent 1 need to select item 4. However, it is easy to see that WMMS 1 = WMMS 2 = −ǫ, WMMS 3 = −1 + 2ǫ, and there exists an WMMS allocation: X 
A.3 Additive-Greedy Algorithm
We consider another sequential allocation greedy algorithm that uses an additive criterion to decide which agent gets the turn to pick an item. Just like the Multiplicative-Greedy, the picking sequence of the agents is not pre-defined and it changes according to the items that have been allocated. Additive-Greedy: Initialize allocation X i to be empty for each i ∈ N . Consider the agent i for whom s i + V i (X i ) is the maximum. In case of ties, choose the agent with the largest s i . If there is still a tie, break tie lexicographically. Let the agent select the most preferred untaken item. Repeat until all items are selected. Table 5 : Instance on which Additive-Greedy performs badly.
Chores
Next we show this algorithm also has a bad performance. Consider the example shown in Table 5 . By setting m and ǫ such that (−ǫ + ǫ 2 ) + (−ǫ) + (m − 2)(−ǫ 2 ) = −1.
In the beginning, agent 2 has a larger share and she selects her most preferred item, i.e. one from {3, · · · , m} since all of them are her favorite items. Note that agent 2 still has a larger value with respect to criterion s i + V i (X i ), until all {3, · · · , m} have been selected by agent 2. At this time, s 2 + V 2 (X 2 ) = (1 − ǫ) − (m − 2)ǫ 2 = ǫ − ǫ 2 . Since s 1 − V 1 (X 1 ) = ǫ > s 2 + V 2 (X 2 ), agent 1 will be the next to select her most preferred item from {1, 2}. Agent 1 will select item 2 since its value is 0. But this does not affect the value of s i − V i (X i ), i = 1, 2, and then agent 1 has to continue to select an item, and only item 1 remains unselected. Thus agent 1 will eventually get item 1. However, it is easy to observe that X ′ 1 = {2} and X ′ 2 = {1, 3, 4} is an WMMS allocation as WMMS 1 = −ǫ, WMMS 2 = −1 + ǫ. Then the algorithm is arbitrarily bad to agent 1.
B EgalGreedy Does not Work for General Case
Readers may suspect that algorithm EgalGreedy has a good performance in the general setting, if Steps 4 and 5 are replaced by finding
and X i * = X i * ∪ {j}. Unfortunately, in the following example, we will see this is not true. Note that Step 2 is invalid since the agents may not have same order of values, thus this step has to be skipped. In the following we consider the case when valuations are all normalized to −1. (Indeed, if the agents' valuations are not normalized to −1, it is easy to see that EgalGreedy is arbitrarily bad.) Let T > c > 1 be any two constant numbers and n be a sufficiently large number such that
